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Corporate Governance and Performance of UK Listed Small and Medium Enterprises  
  
Godfred Adjapong Afrifa1 and Venancio Tauringana2  
  
ABSTRACT  
This paper reports the results of an investigation into the effect of corporate governance factors on 
the performance of listed small and medium enterprises (SMEs), and examines whether this effect 
differs between the two sizes of business. The paper employs unbalanced panel data regression 
analysis on a sample of 234 SMEs listed on the Alternative Investment Market (AIM), for a ten-year 
period (2004-2013). The panel data analysis results show that for all SMEs, corporate governance 
factors – board size, chief executive officer (CEO) age and tenure, and directors’ remuneration – are 
significantly associated with performance of SMEs. The results also suggest that while board size is 
associated with the performance of both small and medium enterprises, CEO age is significant only 
for medium firms and directors’ remuneration only for small ones, while CEO tenure and proportion 
of non-executive directors are not significant for either. Overall, the results imply that corporate 
governance factors affect the performance of listed SMEs. However, this effect differs significantly 
between small and medium enterprises. The findings have important implications for policy makers 
who prescribe corporate governance mechanisms for SMEs. The paper adds to existing literature on 
corporate governance of SMEs by establishing a relationship between firm performance and board 
size, CEO age, CEO tenure, directors’ remuneration and proportion of non-executive directors.  
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1. Introduction  
A myriad of studies have investigated the relationship between corporate governance factors and 
performance (Black et al., 2006; Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2007; Bennett and Robson, 2004), the 
rationale being to make recommendations. For example, Spanos (2005) argues that corporate 
governance has significant implications for the growth prospects of an economy, because proper 
practices diminish risk for investors, attract investment capital and improve corporate performance. 
Dalton and Dalton (2005) also suggest that research into the association between corporate 
governance and performance has important implications for policy makers who prescribe corporate 
governance mechanisms. Johnson et al. (2000) report that weak corporate governance worsened the 
1997 Asian currency crisis; this underscores the importance of corporate governance to firms' 
performance.   
Despite the importance of corporate governance to firms’ performance, only a few studies 
have investigated the relationship between corporate governance factors and performance in SMEs. 
For example, Eisenberg et al. (1998) found a negative relationship between board size and firm value 
when they analysed a sample of small Finnish firms. Bennedsen et al. (2008) also reported a 
significant negative association between board size/CEO age and performance. The limited number 
of research studies on the effect of corporate governance factors on the performance of SMEs is 
surprising, given that SMEs are the mainstay of economic development in most countries around the 
world (Beaver and Prince, 2004; Lukacs, 2005). According to the Department of Business Innovation 
and Skills (2013), “SMEs represent 99.9 per cent of private sector businesses and provide employment 
to an estimated 14.4 million people, which is 59.3 per cent of private sector employment. Their 
estimated combined annual turnover of £1,600 billion accounts for 48.1 per cent of private sector 
turnover”, making SMEs a source of economic growth and employment in the U.K.  Consequently, 
research on whether corporate governance affects the performance of SMEs is important, given that 
any resulting policy implications have the potential to influence the country’s economic growth and 
so the welfare of its citizens.   
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The objective of this current study is to examine the effect of corporate governance factors 
(board size, CEO age, CEO tenure, proportion of non-executive directors' (NEDs), and directors’ 
remuneration) on the performance of SMEs listed on the UK AIM, using a sample of 234 SMEs for 
a ten-year period (2004-2013). These five corporate governance variables were selected because of 
their importance, particularly to SMEs performance (see, Eisenberg et al., 1998; Cowling, 2008; 
Dasilas and Papasyriopoulos, 2015). We control for enterprise-specific characteristics such as annual 
sales growth, firm age, size, asset tangibility and leverage. We then split our sample of SMEs into 
small and medium firms, and investigate whether corporate governance factors affect the performance 
of each size of firm differently.   
The relationship between corporate governance and performance may differ between large 
firms and SMEs because the ownership structure of the latter may mean they do not benefit from the 
detailed corporate governance regime usually found in the former (Dasilas and Papasyriopoulos,  
2015) to safeguard shareholders’ interests from misappropriation by management. According to 
Uhlaner et al. (2007), agency problems in SMEs are minimal given that their management lies mostly 
in the hands of the shareholders. Further, existing corporate governance regimes – such as the  
Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 in the US, the 2003 Guidelines of the Australian Stock Exchange’s 
Corporate Governance Council, the Combined Code on Corporate Governance in the UK, and other 
provisions in the 2004 guidelines of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
– tend to focus on compliance with issues irrelevant to the day-to-day running of SMEs. Given the 
ownership-structure differences between SMEs and large firms, the question then is whether 
corporate governance factors affect the performance of listed SMEs in the same way as in large firms.  
Our study makes important contributions to existing literature and differs from previous 
research in two main ways. First, since the effect of corporate governance on performance may differ 
between large firms and SMEs due to differences in corporate governance mechanisms (Cowling, 
2008), this study differs from previous ones in that it documents evidence of this. Further, existing 
studies on SMEs’ corporate governance and performance do not distinguish between small and 
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medium enterprises (for example, Bennett and Robson, 2004; Bennedsen et al., 2008). We argue that 
if the effect of corporate governance factors differs by size of SME, any prescription for corporate 
governance based on the results of analysis of SMEs as a homogeneous group may be inappropriate. 
The size difference between small and medium enterprises means that corporate governance  
efficiency is expected to be higher in the latter.   
Second, the study uses data on listed UK SMEs to investigate the relationship between 
corporate governance factors and performance. This is significant since the corporate governance 
mechanisms of SMEs change when they are listed (Uhlaner et al., 2007). While corporate governance 
is a choice for unlisted SMEs, the AIM listing rules require the implementation of measures such as 
a board of directors; audit committees, remuneration committee, appointment committees and 
independent directors. We therefore argue that the limited evidence on the effect of corporate 
governance factors on the performance of unlisted SMEs (e.g. Bennedsen et al., 2008) may not apply 
to listed SMEs. Although AIM-listed SMEs are not obliged to comply with the UK’s Combined Code, 
they are encouraged to do so (Mallin and Ow-Yong, 2008). Mendoza (2011) contends that any 
suboptimal corporate governance regime will threaten the continuity of the firm on the AIM. To the 
best of our knowledge, there is no published research that has examined the relationship between 
corporate governance and the performance of UK listed SMEs.   
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section examines the theoretical 
framework for the relationship between corporate governance and performance. This is followed by 
a literature review and development of hypotheses. The study data and research methodology are then 
discussed. The penultimate section discusses the empirical results. The final section presents the 
summary and conclusion.  
  
2. Theoretical framework  
The study adopts a multi-theoretical framework to explain why the corporate governance factors 
investigated may affect the performance of SMEs. For example, the resource-dependency theory of 
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corporate governance concentrates on the importance of the board of directors in enhancing the 
performance of firms (Hillman et al., 2000). According to this theory, the board is crucial to firms in 
providing or securing essential resources (Arnegger et al., 2014; Liu et al., 2014) in two ways: through 
directors’ diverse knowledge and expertise (which help to improve the performance of the firm) and 
through their extensive links with the outside world (which give the organisation access to external 
resources, including suppliers, buyers, public-policy makers, social groups and legitimacy). Therefore, 
in resource-dependency theory, a larger board should be associated with the firm’s performance.   
 Resource-dependency theory can also explain the relationship between directors’ remuneration and 
performance (Barringer and Milkovich, 1998; Tremblay et al., 2003), because firms must reward 
directors well in order to attract the best people onto the board (Tremblay et al., 2003). Since directors 
are seen as useful resources, hiring high calibre of directors will ensure high-quality resources, which 
will enhance performance (Conyon and Peck, 1998). The ability of a firm to extract both internal and 
external resources will depend on the calibre of the board of directors. Daily and Johnson (1997) 
suggest that prestigious directors not only increase companies’ legitimacy but also provide links to 
other prestigious individuals.   
 In this study, we rely on the lifecycle theory to explain the effect of CEO tenure on firm performance 
consistent with previous research (for example, Giambatista et al., 2005). The basis for expecting 
CEO tenure to influence performance is the proposition by Hambrick and Fukutomi (1991) that such 
tenure has five phases: ‘response to mandate’, ‘experimentation’, ‘selection of an enduring theme’, 
‘convergence’ and ‘dysfunction’. Hambrick and Fukutomi (1991) suggest that the early stages of a 
CEO’s tenure (including ‘response to mandate’ and ‘selection of an enduring theme’) are 
characterised by high performance because of a willingness to learn, determination to succeed, 
openness and high-risk interest. However, according to Hambrick et al. (1993), performance begins 
to fall primarily since the CEO continues to hold onto an obsolete paradigm; there is also a decrease 
in task interest. They further argue that newly enacted CEOs enjoy maximised performance for the 
first six years of their tenure, after which performance begins to decrease.   
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       The market learning theory has also been used to explain the effect of CEO age on company 
performance (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990; Holmström, 1999). This theory argues that younger CEOs 
are more risk-averse and less aggressive than their older counterparts (Hirshleifer and Thakor, 1992; 
Zwiebel, 1995), which may result in their foregoing profitable ventures through being unwilling to 
commit. In contrast, older CEOs may have a track record, resulting from the scrutiny of both the 
labour and financial markets (Golden and Zajac, 2001); this allows them to be more able and willing 
to take on higher risk (Chok and Sun, 2007). Also, older CEOs are more determined to invent 
something new resulting in their taking on higher risk (Belghitar and Clark, 2012), which may result 
in increased performance. Therefore, market learning theory suggests that having an older CEO will 
result in the maximisation of firm performance.   
       Finally, the effect of NEDs on performance is explained most strongly by agency theory, 
according to which their presence reduces costs. Under this theory, NEDs are seen as more 
independent than executive directors (Dehaene et al., 2001); they also contribute to the superior 
performance of firms by giving expert advice to management (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Therefore, in 
agency theory, a higher proportion of NEDs on the board should lead to an increase in performance.   
  
3. Literature review and development of hypotheses  
We discuss below why corporate governance factors (board size, CEO age, CEO tenure, proportion 
of NEDs, and directors’ remuneration) may affect the performance of AIM-listed SMEs, and why the 
effect of these factors on performance may differ between small and medium enterprises.  
 
3.1 Board size  
The costs of a larger board may outweigh the benefits, particularly in SMEs, where agency problems 
are minimal (Eisenberg et al., 1998) and there is no need for the extensive monitoring achieved by a 
larger board. Generally, larger boards are less effective in monitoring managers, since they are 
difficult to co-ordinate (for example, getting all of them at the table for discussions). Also, it becomes 
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very difficult to process problems due to the large number of people involved (Eisenberg et al., 1998). 
A negative association between board size and performance was reported by Eisenberg et al. (1998), 
Yermack (1996), Vafeas (1999) and Dahya and McConnell (2008). We also expect there to be a 
difference in the board size-performance association between small and medium enterprises (Cowling, 
2008). According to Bennett and Robson (2004), the influence of the board on performance varies 
between firms of different sizes. Therefore, our first set of hypotheses is that:  
H1a There is a significant negative association between board size and SMEs’ performance.  
H1b There is a significant difference in the effect of board size on the performance of small and of 
medium enterprises.  
  
3.2 CEO age  
Avery and Chevalier (1999) argue that relatively young CEOs may be risk-averse because of their 
lack of confidence in their executive skills and so fear of making mistakes. Also, because younger 
CEOs may lack experience, they may be more likely to make errors of judgement in decision-making, 
leading to increased costs and so lower performance. The younger CEO’s lack of a track record 
(Holmström, 1999) may also inhibit performance, through making them reluctant to take on risky but 
highly profitable ventures. A positive relationship between CEO age and performance was found by 
(Yim, 2013). We also expect the association between CEO age and performance to be different for 
small and for medium enterprises, as the latter have the resources to hire more highly qualified and 
experienced CEOs. Afrifa (2013) found a difference in the effect of CEO age on performance between 
small and medium firms. Our second set of hypotheses therefore states that:  
H2a There is a significant positive association between CEO age and SMEs’ performance.  
H2b There is a significant difference in the effect of CEO age on the performance of small and of 
medium enterprises.  
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3.3 CEO tenure  
CEOs who have been at the helm for a longer period are expected to perform better than those who 
have been in post for a shorter period, because the former have become more familiar with the affairs 
of the company. Longer tenure also helps the CEO to establish good rapport with stakeholders, and 
to plan and execute a long-term strategy, which will enhance the performance of the company. A 
study by Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) found a positive relationship between CEO tenure and 
company performance. The association between CEO tenure and performance is expected to be 
different between small and medium enterprises because the available evidence suggests differences 
in the average CEO tenure by firms’ size. For example, Homroy (2012) found that average CEO 
tenure in larger firms is 9.35 years, compared to 6.60 in small firms. Our third pair of hypotheses 
therefore states that:  
H3a There is a significant positive association between CEO tenure and SMEs’ performance.  
H3b There is a significant difference in the effect of CEO tenure on the performance of small and of 
medium enterprises.  
  
3.4 Proportion of non-executive directors  
The uncomplicated nature of SMEs business suggests that their performance may be negatively 
associated with proportion of non-executive directors on the board (Yermack, 1996). Some have 
suggested that NEDs may be ineffective in independently judging company performance, due to 
inadequate knowledge of the company (Anderson and Reeb, 2004) and CEOs’ dominant role in 
selecting them (Lansberg, 1988). For example, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) suggest that CEOs 
sometimes hire NEDs for political reasons, which mean the latter may be ineffective in monitoring 
executive directors. A negative association between NEDs and performance was reported by 
Yermack (1996). A difference in the association between NEDs and performance is expected for 
small and for medium enterprises because the percentages of NEDs on their boards are likely to be 
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different due to their relative resource bases. For example, research by Denis and Sarin (1999) found 
that small firms have a lower proportion of NEDs. Hence, our fourth set of hypotheses is that:  
H4a There is a significant negative association between the proportion of NEDs and SMEs’ 
performance.  
H4b There is a significant difference in the effect of the proportion of NEDs on the performance of 
small and of medium enterprises.  
  
3.5 Directors’ remuneration  
The effect of directors’ remuneration on performance has been documented by previous research 
(Main et al., 1996; Brick et al., 2006). High compensation packages may impair the directors’ 
judgement, giving managers the advantage of being able to pursue their own interests at the expense 
of performance. Also, higher compensation may lead to the practice of ‘mutual back scratching’ by 
directors who collectively propose better packages for each other at the expense of performance 
(Brick et al., 2006). A negative relationship between directors' remuneration and firm performance 
was documented by Ozkan (2007). Given the limited resources of SMEs (Storey, 1994), we 
hypothesise a negative relationship because SMEs are less profitable than large firms, and huge 
salaries have a negative impact on performance. We expect the association between directors’ 
remuneration and performance to vary between small and medium enterprises, because (assuming 
both firm sizes pay the same salary) this expense on performance will be felt more by small enterprises 
since their revenue is generally lower. Our fifth set of hypotheses is that:  
H5a There is a significant negative association between directors’ remuneration and the 
performance of SMEs.  
H5b There is a significant difference in the effect of directors’ remuneration on the performance of 
small and of medium firms.  
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3.6 Control variables  
To reduce the probability of omitted-variable bias, we include a number of control variables. 
According to Bartov et al. (2000), failure to control for confounding variables could lead to falsely 
rejecting a hypothesis when in fact it should be accepted. Specifically, we control for firms’ annual 
sales growth, company age, company size, asset tangibility and financial leverage. These control 
variables were identified on the basis of prior research.   
  
4. Data and research methodology  
4.1 Sample selection and data  
The data used in this study was obtained from the AMADEUS database, a commercial database 
provided by Bureau Van Dijk Electronic Publishing. This is a comprehensive database containing 
financial information on over 10 million public and private firms. The sample for the study is drawn 
from listed SMEs in the UK for the period from 2004 to 2013. Financial firms such as banks and 
insurance were excluded because they have different accounting requirements. Moreover, firm-years 
with anomalies in their accounts such as negative values in assets, sales, current assets, fixed assets 
were removed. Also, firms missing substantial amount of information were excluded. Finally, 
variables with extreme values were winsorized at the 1 percent (see, Durnev and Kim, 2005; Black 
et al., 2006). The final sample of SMEs, which is based on the requirements established by the 
European Commission’s recommendation 2003/361/CE of 6rd May, 2003, on the definition of SMEs, 
therefore consists of an unbalanced panel of 234 firms for which information is available. It represents 
2,340 firm-year observations. By allowing for both entry and exit, the use of an unbalanced panel 
partially mitigates potential selection and survivor bias. Specifically, the following criteria are used 
for the selection of SMEs3:  
• Turnover of less than €50 million; and  
                                                 
3
 The average exchange rate per each year from 2014-2013 was used to convert the total assets and turnover values from 
British Pounds Sterling to Euro.  
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• Possession of less than €43 million of total assets.  
4.2 Regression model specification  
We specify the regression analysis model below to examine the relationship between corporate 
governance and performance of UK listed SMEs. In equation 1, all right-hand side variables are 
lagged by one period in order to alleviate the concern that QRATIO and corporate governance factors 
may be simultaneously determined in equilibrium.  
QRATIOit = β0 + β1BSIZEi,t–1 +β2CEOAGEi,t–1 + β3CEOTENi,t–1 + β4NEDsi,t–1 + β5DREMi,t–1 +  
 β6GROWTHi,t–1 + β7AGEi,t–1 + β8COSIZEi,t–1 + β9ATANi,t–1 + Β10LEVi,t–1 + εi,t–1 (1)     
We define all the variables in Table 1 below.  
[Table 1 about here]  
Since panel data regression is used, the Hausman’s test is utilised to decide whether to employ the 
Fixed Effects (FE) model or Random Effect (RE) model by first determining whether there is a 
correlation between the unobservable heterogeneity (µ i) of each firm and the explanatory variables of 
the model. The Hausman test was performed, which rejected the null hypothesis that the unobserved 
heterogeneity is uncorrelated with the regressors. This finding means that the RE is significantly 
different from the FE, and therefore the FE is the more consistent and efficient method to use.   
        A Chow test was performed to determine whether corporate governance factors had a 
significantly different impact on the performance of small and of medium enterprises. A Chow test is 
a statistical and econometric test of whether the coefficients in two linear regressions on different data 
sets are equal; it is often used to determine whether the impact of the independent variables on the 
different subgroups of the sample vary.   
  
4.3 Descriptive statistics  
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the performance, corporate governance and control variables 
for the full period (2004-2013) for all SMEs included, and also the mean statistics of the enterprises 
divided into small and medium sizes (again, as defined by requirements established by the European 
Commission’s recommendation 2003/361/CE of 6rd May, 2003). The mean performance measured 
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by Tobin’s Q ratio (QRATIO) for all the SMEs from 2004 to 2013 is 1.4474. The results also show a 
difference in the performance between small firms (mean QRATIO = 1.2072) and medium firms 
(mean QRATIO = 1.6876); this supports the argument that larger firms are more profitable (Yang 
and Chen, 2009). Table 2 also shows that the average board size is approximately 5. Research by  
Chahine (2004) also found that the average board size of SMEs listed on the Nouveau and the Second  
Marché in France was approximately 5, the same as our finding. Both indicate that the board size of 
SMEs is different from that of large firms, in which Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) found average 
board size to be 13 and Denis and Sarin (1999) approximately 10. We found average CEO age to be 
51.8785 years, and tenure 4.5669 years. Directors’ remuneration is on average £0.3321 million and 
the average proportion of NEDs is 51.3956 percent. The fact that the latter is above 50 percent means 
that the average SME firm does comply with the UK Combined Code 2010, which requires the board 
to be dominated by NEDs. The average listed SME in the sample is larger than unlisted SMEs in the  
UK (see García-Teruel and Martínez-Solano, 2010) and larger than listed SMEs in Europe (see,  
Lardon and Deloof, 2014), judging from the total assets size.  
[Table 2 about here]  
5. Empirical analysis  
5.1 Correlation analysis  
 The results of the Pearson correlation coefficients are presented in Table 3 for all continuous variables 
included in the study, and indicate a significant and negative correlation between QRATIO and board 
size at the 1 percent level. They also indicate a significant and positive correlation between QRATIO 
and both CEO age and CEO tenure, at the 1 percent level. The correlations between the independent 
variables are also significant. The correlation between board size and CEO age is 0.1003, significant 
at the 1 percent level. CEO tenure and board size have a correlation coefficient of 0.2883, significant 
at the 1 per cent level. The correlation between CEO age and tenure is 0.1603, significant at the 1 per 
cent level. Board size and directors’ remuneration have a correlation of 0.2533 at the 1 percent level 
of significance. The correlation between CEO tenure and directors’ remuneration is 0.1324, 
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significant at the 1 percent level. The correlations among the control variables also suggest that 
multicollinearity should not be a problem in multiple regression analysis since the coefficient values 
are low. Field (2005) suggests that multicollinearity becomes an issue only when the correlation 
coefficient exceeds 0.80.   
[Table 3 about here]  
5.2 Regression analysis  
We start by analysing the relationship between corporate governance factors and performance for all 
SMEs for the 10 years from 2004 to 2013. The panel data regression results presented in Table 4 
show that the adjusted R2 of the full sample in Column 1 is 44.05 percent. Board size is negatively 
associated with QRATIO at the 1 per cent level, suggesting that increasing the number of directors 
on the board of UK listed SMEs reduces performance. This finding confirms H1a and is consistent 
with prior studies in larger firms, such as those by Bennedsen et al. (2008), O’Connell and Cramer 
(2010) and studies in SMEs such as (Chahine, 2004; Eisenberg et al., 1998). The finding is consistent 
with the notions that SMEs have limited financial resources (Storey, 1994) and no need for a large 
board size due to their activities being less cumbersome. In this case, any unnecessary addition to the 
boards of SMEs will simply result in a waste of financial resources, leading to reduced performance. 
[Table 4 about here]  
The results also show that CEO age is positively associated with QRATIO at the 5 percent level, and 
therefore we accept H2a. The statistically positive coefficient indicates that older CEOs improve the 
performance of AIM-listed SMEs (Holmström, 1999); this finding is consistent with that of Yim 
(2013). We also find that CEO tenure is positively and significantly associated with performance at 
the 1 percent level, which confirms H3a. This result shows that the longer a CEO’s tenure, the greater 
the performance of an AIM-listed SME – since a longer-tenured CEO accumulates company-specific 
knowledge (Shen, 2003).   
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        The results also show the association between directors’ remuneration and QRATIO to be 
negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent level, and therefore consistent with H5a. This 
result shows that maximising the compensation package of directors leads to reduced performance of  
UK SMEs. Finally, the results show a negative but insignificant association between NEDs and 
QRATIO; this means we cannot accept our H4a and that the proportion of NEDs has no influence on 
performance of AIM listed SMEs.  
        Among the control variables, annual sales growth is positive and significantly related to  
QRATIO at the 1 percent level. Company age is shown to be significant and positively related to 
QRATIO at the 1 percent level. Company size is positively associated with QRATIO at the 1 percent 
level. Asset tangibility is significant and negatively related to QRATIO at the 1 percent level. 
However, there is no association between leverage and QRATIO.   
        In the second analysis, the firms under consideration are classified according to whether they are 
small or medium. The adjusted R2 of the small firms in Column 2 is 34.41 percent, while that of the 
medium firms in Column 3 is 38.62 percent. The coefficient of board size for the small firms is 
−0.1164 and significant at the 1 percent level. Under the medium firms, it is −0.0144 and significant 
at the 1 percent level. This shows that a reduction in board size will improve performance more in 
small than in medium firms – perhaps because small firms are more constrained in financial resources, 
meaning a reduction in board size has a greater impact. The Chow test in Column 4 of Table 4 
indicates a significant difference in the effect of board size on the performance of small and of 
medium firms. Thus, hypothesis H1b is supported.  
      The coefficient of CEO age is positive for both small and medium firms; however, the association 
is significant for the latter but not the former. The significant coefficient level for medium firms 
suggest that the accumulated experience and knowledge of an older CEO impact positively on the 
performance of such firms. The Chow test in Column 4 of Table 4 indicates that significant 
differences exist between the effects of CEO age on the performance of the two sizes of firm. Thus, 
hypothesis H2b is supported. The coefficients for CEO tenure in small and medium firms are 0.0504 
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and 0.0215 respectively but the relationship is insignificant for both. The Chow test result in Column 
4 of Table 4 indicates that the impact of CEO tenure on the performance of small and of medium 
firms is significantly different.   
The coefficient for the proportion of NEDs is positive for small firms and negative for medium 
firms, however the relationship is insignificant for both. The Chow test results in Column 4 of Table 
4 indicate that a significant difference exists between small and medium firms in terms of the effect 
of the proportion of NEDs on performance. Thus, hypothesis H4b is supported. Finally, the coefficient 
on directors’ remuneration is negative and significant at the 1 percent level for small firms but 
negative and insignificant for medium ones, meaning that a reduction in directors’ remuneration will 
improve the performance of small firms but have no significant impact on that of medium firms. The 
Chow test in Column 4 of Table 4 indicates that significant differences exist between the effects of 
directors’ remuneration on the performance of the two categories of firms. Thus, hypothesis H5b is 
supported. Consequently, the overall conclusion from the Chow test results is that there are significant 
differences in the impact of corporate governance factors on the performance of small and of medium 
firms.  
  
6. Robustness Tests  
Both the firms and variables used in this study could be affected by the financial crisis that started as 
a sub-prime crisis in 2007 but unfolded into the Great Recession in 2009. Also, the corporate 
governance influence on performance may differ based on whether a firm is making a profit or loss. 
First, the sample is divided into pre-recession (2005-2007)4, during the recession (2008-2010) and 
after recession (2011-2013). Second, the sample is divided into two based on whether a firm makes a 
profit or loss in any particular year, as measured by return on assets (ROA). ROA is defined as profit 
                                                 
4
 The 2004 data is excluded because all variables are lagged by one year.  
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before interest and tax divided by total assets. The results obtained are not significantly different from 
the results of running the regression for the whole sample.   
The objective of this final analysis is to determine whether there is a significant association 
between corporate governance and UK SMEs performance for unprofitable or profitable observations 
and pre- recession, during recession or after recession periods. The first three columns of Table 5 
contain the results from the estimates of Model 1 for pre-recession observations (2005-2007), during 
recession observations (2008-2010) and after recession (2011-2013). The adjusted R2 under the 
prerecession is 30.68 percent, during recession period is 29.04 percent and for the post-recession 
period is 31.38 percent. The coefficients of BSIZE and DREM are negative and significant in columns 
1 to 3. The coefficients of CEOAGE and CEOTEN are positive and significant in columns 1 to 3.  
Once again the coefficient of NEDs is not significant in columns 1 to 3.   
The last two columns of Table 5 contain the results of running Model 1 for both unprofitable 
and profitable observations.  The R2 of observations with loss is 36.19 percent; whiles the R2 of 
observations with profit is 38.35 percent. The results show that the coefficients of BSIZE and DREM 
are negative and significant in columns 4 to 5. The coefficients of CEOAGE and CEOTEN are 
positive and significant in columns 4 to 5.  Once again the coefficient of NEDs is not significant in 
columns 4 to 5. These results indicate the robustness of the results obtained above and confirms the 
relationship between corporate governance and UK listed SMEs performance.  
[Table 5 about here]  
  
7. Summary and conclusion   
The objective of the study is to investigate the effect of corporate governance factors on the 
performance of UK listed SMEs. The study is based on a panel data regression analysis of 234 SMEs 
over a ten-year period (2004-2013). The results suggest that corporate governance factors (board size,  
CEO age and tenure, and directors’ remuneration) have a significant impact on the performance of  
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UK listed SMEs. These findings are consistent with previous research in respect of board size 
(Yermack, 1996; Vafeas, 1999), CEO age (Yim, 2013), CEO tenure (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996) 
and directors’ remuneration (Ozkan, 2007).   
        This study also provides evidence of the different effects of corporate governance on the 
performance of small versus medium firms. The results show that board size has a significant negative 
impact on the performance of both sizes of firm. However, CEO age has a significant impact on the 
performance only of medium firms, and directors’ remuneration is significant only for small firms. 
Both CEO tenure and proportion of NEDs have no significant impact on the performance of either 
small or medium firms. Despite these similarities and differences, the Chow test results indicate that 
the five corporate governance factors differ between small and medium firms.   
       The study makes important contributions to extant literature and has implications for SMEs and 
policy makers. The study adds to the limited empirical evidence that exists (for example, Bennedsen 
et al., 2008; Eisenberg et al., 1998) on the effect of corporate governance on the performance of SMEs. 
More importantly, it documents the effect of corporate governance factors on the performance of UK 
listed SMEs. The study also provides new evidence that these factors have different impacts on the 
performance of small and of medium firms. This is significant in suggesting that any corporate 
governance prescription for SMEs as a homogeneous group may be unsuitable for either small or 
medium firms.   
        In terms of policy implications, our finding of a negative relationship between board size and 
the performance of both small and medium firms leads us to recommend that, given the limited 
resources of SMEs (Pansiri and Temtime, 2008), they need to focus their attention on reducing board 
size to an optimal level. A positive relationship between CEO age and the performance of medium 
firms suggests that such firms should encourage their CEOs to remain in post for a long time. Finally, 
since there is a negative relationship between directors’ remuneration and the performance of small 
firms, we recommend that small firms curtail their payments to directors to improve performance.  
18  
  
We are aware of potential endogeneity problems, which can significantly affect empirical 
findings. Generally, endogeneity problems arise in three different ways: (1) correlation with the error 
term (Wooldridge, 2002:50); (2) omitted variable bias; and (3) simultaneity (Larcker and Rusticus,  
2010:186). One way to reduce endogeneity problem of omitted variable bias is to adapt a system of 
Two Stage Least Square (2SLS) using appropriate instrument; however, this approach introduces the 
problem of identifying the correct instruments (Dam and Scholtens, 2012). In this paper we have tried 
to reduce potential endogeneity problem of simultaneity, which is found to be the most common 
endogeneity problem in corporate governance research by lagging our independent variables and 
investigate the association between changes in the independent variables and the dependent variable 
(see, Mina et al., 2013).   
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Table 1: Variable Definitions  
 
 Variables  Acronym  Measurement  
 
Dependent variable  
    
Tobin's Q Ratio  QRATIO  Ratio of market value of equity plus the book value of total assets minus the book value of equity divided by the book value of total assets  
Corporate Governance variables  
    
Board size  BSIZE  Total number of all directors on the board at the end of the financial year  
CEO age  CEOAGE  CEO age at the end of each financial year  
CEO tenure  CEOTEN  Number of years the CEO has been in post at the end of each financial year  
Proportion of NEDs  NEDs  Number of NEDs divided by total directors on the board at the end of the financial year  
Remuneration of directors  DREM  Natural log of the total remuneration of directors for each financial year  
Control variables  
    
Annual Sales Growth  GROWTH  percentage change in sales revenue over the previous year  
Company age  AGE  Number of years between incorporation and the calendar year–end of each firm  
Company size  COSIZE  The natural log of the firm’s turnover at the end of the financial year  
Financial leverage  LEV  Ratio of total debt divided by capital at the end of the financial year  
Asset tangibility  ATAN  Ratio of fixed assets divided by total assets at the end of the financial year  
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics  
 
The table provides the sample characteristics of 2,340 firm–years across 234 unique listed UK SMEs over the period 2004–2013. QRATIO is the ratio of market 
value of equity plus the book value of total assets minus the book value of equity divided by the book value of total assets. BSIZE is total number of all directors 
on the board. CEOAGE is the age of the CEO. CEOTEN is the number of years the CEO has been in post. NEDS is the percentage of non–executive directors 
on the board. DREM is the total remuneration of directors. GROWTH is the percentage change in sales revenue over the previous year. AGE is the number of 
years between incorporation and the calendar year-end of each firm. COSIZE is the firms’ total assets. ATAN is the ratio of fixed assets divided by total assets.  
LEV is the ratio of total debt as a percentage of total assets.   
 Variables    Total sample  Small  Medium  
 
 Performance Measures  ObS.  Mean   Std dev.  Median  Min.   Max.   Mean  Mean  
 
  
QRATIO  2079  1.4474  1.3894  0.8729  0.2653  1.9355  1.2072  1.6876  
Corporate  governance factors   
                
BSIZE  
1971  
  5.0386    4.8400    6.0000      3.0000    11.0000    4.8043    5.2729  
CEOAGE   2079  51.8785  38.8997  47.0000    28.0000    77.0000  51.9605  51.7965  
CEOTEN   2079    4.5669    3.9416    3.1659      1.4251    37.8034    3.6822    5.4516  
DREM (£M)  2052    0.3321    0.2645    0.3657      0.0361      0.7201    0.2879    0.3763  
NEDs   1917  51.3956  37.7472  50.0000      0.0000      0.8451  47.8758  54.9154  
Control Variables  
                
GROWTH  1998    8.7754    4.9203    5.4976  −6.9083    18.1133    6.4573  11.0934  
COAGE   2061  14.2454  15.1830    8.2069     5.1206    99.6740  11.6189  16.8718  
COSIZE(£M)  2079  24.6269  25.0512  22.4147     1.5412    41.8390  21.9053  27.3486  
ATAN  2079  37.0151  27.2930  35.0000   25.0000    87.0000  36.4700  37.5600  
LEV   2016  22.4008  40.4094    1.4900     0.0000    61.8800  18.7926  26.0089  
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Table 3: Pearson Correlation Coefficients  
 
The table provides Pearson correlation coefficients for the 2,340 firm-years across 234 unique listed UK SMEs over the period 2004-2013. QRATIO is the ratio of market value of 
equity plus the book value of total assets minus the book value of equity divided by the book value of total assets. BSIZE is total number of all directors on the board. CEOAGE is 
the age of the CEO. CEOTEN is the number of years the CEO has been in post. NEDS is the percentage of non-executive directors on the board. DREM is the total remuneration of 
directors. GROWTH is the percentage change in sales revenue over the previous year. AGE is the number of years between incorporation and the calendar year-end of each firm. 
COSIZE is the natural log of firms’ total assets. ATAN is the ratio of fixed assets divided by total assets. LEV is the ratio of total debt as a percentage of total assets.   
 
 
QRATIO  1  
                    
                        
BSIZE  –0.2113  1  
                
--  
  
  0.0000  
                    
CEOAGE    0.1101  0.1003  1  
                
  
  0.0000  0.0024  
                  
CEOTEN    0.0930  0.2883    0.1603  1  
              
  
  0.0000  0.0000    0.0000  
                
NEDS  –0.1204  0.0969  –0.0925  –0.0064  1  
            
  
  0.0061  0.0004    0.0019    0.0028  
              
DREM  –0.0501  0.2533    0.0283    0.1324  –0.019  1  
          
25  
  
 QRATIO  BSIZE  CEOAGE  CEOTEN  NEDS  DREM  GROWTH  AGE  COSIZE  ATAN  LEV  
  
  0.0000  0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.0000  
            
GROWTH    0.0143  0.0604    0.0835    0.0271    0.0027  0.0709  1  
        
  
  0.0000  0.0000    0.0009    0.0000    0.2263  0.0000  
          
AGE    0.0821  0.1101    0.1332    0.0041    0.0077  0.0738    0.0344  1  
      
  
  0.0002  0.0016    0.0008    0.0258    0.0002  0.0231    0.0325  
        
COSIZE    0.0269  0.0562  –0.0126    0.1234  –0.2067  0.0541  –0.0209    0.0193  1  
    
  
  0.0000  0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.0000  0.0000    0.0000    0.0000  
      
ATAN  –0.0536  0.0473    0.0441  –0.1063    0.0483  0.1211    0.0132  –0.0074  –0.1138  1  
  
  
  0.0000  0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.0000  0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.0000  
    
LEV  –0.0004  0.4704  –0.0111    0.1643  –0.0006  0.0129  –0.0012    0.0025  –0.0306  –0.008  1  
  
  0.8569  0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.7892  0.0000    0.5893    0.1896    0.0000    0.0000  
  
  Table 4: Corporate Governance and Firm Performance (QRATIO)    
 
The table presents firm fixed effects regression with QRATIO as the dependent variable. QRATIO is the ratio of 
market value of equity plus the book value of total assets minus the book value of equity divided by the book value of 
total assets. BSIZE is total number of all directors on the board. CEOAGE is the age of the CEO. CEOTEN is the 
number of years the CEO has been in post. NEDS is the percentage of non-executive directors on the board. DREM is 
the total remuneration of directors. GROWTH is the percentage change in sales revenue over the previous year. AGE 
is the number of years between incorporation and the calendar year-end of each firm. COSIZE is the natural log of 
firms’ total assets. ATAN is the ratio of fixed assets divided by total assets. LEV is the ratio of total debt as a percentage 
of total assets. The sample consists of 2,340 firm-years across 234 unique listed UK SMEs over the period 2004-2013. 
t-values are in parentheses below coefficients.  
 VARIABLES  FULL SAMPLE  MEDIUM  SMALL  Chow test  
***Significant at the 0.01 level; **Significant at the 0.05 level; *Significant at the 0.10 level  
  
  
  
Adjusted R2  0.4405  0.3862  0.3441  
 
 Hausman test  0000  
  
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FACTORS  
0000  0000  
 
  
 
BSIZE
 t –1(log)  –0.0116***  –0.0144***  –0.1164***  17.12***  
  
(–4.11)  (–3.74)  (–4.02)  
  
CEOAGE
 t –1(log)  0.0179**  0.0465**  0.0145  17.17***  
  
(2.77)  (3.02)  (0.78)  
  
NEDS
 t –1(%)  –0.0105  –0.0130  0.0443  23.05***  
  
(–0.58)  (–0.87)  (0.81)  
  
CEOTEN
 t –1(log)  0.0345***  0.0215  0.0504  25.01***  
  
(4.48)  (4.09)  (3.24)  
  
DREM
 t –1(log)  –0.0924***  –0.0470  –0.150***  18.59***  
  
  
CONTROL VARIABLES  
  
(–3.39)  (–0.70)  (–4.84)  
  
GROWTH
 t –1(%)  0.173***  0.184***  0.624***  –  
  
(4.77)  (4.20)  (4.96)  
  
AGE
 t –1(log)  0.0407***  0.0350***  0.0489**  –  
  
(4.11)  (4.31)  (3.43)  
  
COSIZE
 t –1(log)  0.131***  0.0246***  0.887**  –  
  
(4.35)  (4.61)  (3.14)  
  
ATAN
 t –1(%)  –1.788***  –1.060***  –3.395**  –  
  
(–4.72)  (–4.01)  (–3.20)  
  
LEV
 t –1(%)  –0.326  –1.412  3.497  –  
  
(–0.49)  (–0.12)  (1.84)  
  
_CONS  9.543***  8.001***  17.03***  –  
  
(11.26)  (19.25)  (7.22)  
  
N  1883  1092  791  
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Table 5: Economic Condition, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance   
 
The table presents firm fixed effects regression with QRATIO as the dependent variable. QRATIO is the ratio of market 
value of equity plus the book value of total assets minus the book value of equity divided by the book value of total assets. 
BSIZE is total number of all directors on the board. CEOAGE is the age of the CEO. CEOTEN is the number of years the 
CEO has been in post. NEDS is the percentage of non-executive directors on the board. DREM is the total remuneration of 
directors. GROWTH is the percentage change in sales revenue over the previous year. AGE is the number of years between 
incorporation and the calendar year-end of each firm. COSIZE is the natural log of firms’ total assets. ATAN is the ratio of 
fixed assets divided by total assets. LEV is the ratio of total debt as a percentage of total assets. The sample consists of 
2,340 firm-years across 234 unique listed UK SMEs over the period 2004-2013. t-values are in parentheses below 
coefficients.  
Variables  
Pre-  During-  
recession  recession  
After- recession  Positive   
ROA  
Negative  
ROA  
Adjusted R2  0.3068  0.2904  0.3138  0.3619  0.3835  
  
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FACTORS  
  
BSIZE
 t –1(log)  –0.0214***  –0.0175***  –0.0139***  –0.0502***  –0.0128***  
  
(–4.00)  (–4.29)  (–4.43)  (–4.01)  (–4.36)  
CEOAGE
 t –1(log)  0.0902***  0.0536**  0.0334*  0.0139**  0.0577***  
  
(4.65)  (3.46)  (2.09)  (3.49)  (4.35)  
NEDS
 t –1(%)  –0.022  –0.0692  –0.0347  –0.0225  –0.0428  
  
(–0.56)  (–0.77)  (–0.89)  (–0.38)  (–0.03)  
CEOTEN
 t –1(log)  0.0318***  0.0458***  0.0263***  0.0417***  0.0122***  
  
(4.73)  (4.96)  (4.69)  (6.22)  (4.17)  
DREM
 t –1(log)  –0.0103**  –0.046**  –0.065***  –0.0475**  –0.0127***  
  
(–3.21)  (–3.47)  (–4.56)  (–3.44)  (–4.68)  
  
CONTROL VARIABLES  
  
GROWTH
 t –1(%)  0.0593***  0.0434***  1.5998***  0.256***  0.2808***  
  
(4.13)  (4.15)  (4.14)  (4.27)  (4.93)  
AGE
 t –1(log)  0.0152***  0.0735**  0.0304***  0.0794**  0.0158**  
  
(4.80)  (3.34)  (4.28)  (3.23)  (3.65)  
COSIZE
 t –1(log)  0.0962***  0.448***  1.625**  0.335***  0.299***  
  
(4.47)  (5.29)  (2.98)  (4.83)  (5.03)  
ATAN
 t –1(%)  –0.5741***  –0.8603***  –0.2724***  –1.2022***  –0.7543**  
  
(–4.73)  (–4.69)  (–4.14)  (–4.51)  (–3.06)  
 LEV
 t –1(%)  –1.3112  –0.1874  –1.3847  –0.2393  –0.7551  
  
(–0.95)  (–0.22)  (–0.38)  (–0.47)  (–0.78)  
_CONS  11.40***  14.50***  11.406***  15.23***  14.50***  
  
(6.36)  (6.81)  (6.31)  (9.96)  (8.09)  
N  753  564  566  1374  509  
***Significant at the 0.01 level; **Significant at the 0.05 level; *Significant at the 0.10 level  
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